Ironically, there was tremendous consideration given toward minimizing civilian casualties and collateral damage to critical Iraqi infrastructure needed for follow-on stabilization efforts.
There remained a gap in campaign planning for the period between cessation of major combat operations and wholesale stabilization of the country, a gap that had strategic implications. That historical pitfall is at the root of the following passage from Joint Publication Whereas planners left no stone unturned in the intelligence preparation of the battlespace as it related to the defeat of Iraqi forces and ultimate removal of the Hussein regime, there was little corresponding depth to the analysis of the next necessary target audience within the campaign design, the Iraqi people.
Policymakers, commanders, and planners alike were content to lean on the frail assumption that the coalition would be accepted by Iraqis throughout the country with open arms. Properly estimating the magnitude of stability and support operations that will be necessary after the end of decisive combat operations is the only way to prevent the emergence of a strategic gap. It is the military that will have to grapple with the immediate and diverse challenges that accompany the cessation of large-scale combat operations. To the central point, it is the military that immediately will have to deal with the indigenous population until the cavalry arrives in the form of more support-focused and better resourced U.
They become cultural issues; issues of traumatized population's welfare, food, shelter; issues of government; issues of cultural, ethnic, religious problems; historical issues; economic issues that you have to deal with, that aren't part of the METT-T process, necessarily. And the rigid military thinking can get you in trouble. What you need to know isn't what our intel apparatus is geared to collect for you, and to analyze, and to present to you. This would draw attention to the reality that the civilian population will be the centrepiece of the post-hostilities environment.
As currently depicted, this view of the battlespace does little to reinforce the requirements within Joint Publication Currently, joint doctrine for intelligence does not lay the foundation for achieving such leverage. Our intelligence system is designed to support a Cold War kind of operation.
We are there to IPB the battlefield. We have fallen in love with the wrong revolution. It also seems fair to argue that conflict termination and the role of force in ensuring stable peace time outcomes has always been a weakness in modern military thinking.
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Tactics and strategy, and military victory, have always had priority over grand strategy and winning the peace. In certain aspects of campaign planning, increased efficiency and effectiveness resulting from technological breakthroughs lend credence to this line of thinking. But it is clear that the joint force did not place the same premium on gaining an adequate understanding of the Iraqi people and their culture. Linguistic knowledge is one thing, but understanding the conventions, subtleties and nuances of a language and culture is something different.
The first step must be the acceptance that history is important and while it may not repeat itself as some might argue, it surely holds the clues that will shed light on current and future cultural intelligence requirements. When entire volumes are written on anticipating ethnic conflict and history is not mentioned at all, America has indeed become ignorant. That same intolerance must be maintained in planning for missions across the operational spectrum within a comprehensive campaign design.
Rather, just as the U. Since doctrine is a guide, the force must be guided in its intelligence activities by those who can provide the strongest beacon on historical and cultural issues. The second step should be a culturally-oriented addition to the intelligence series within joint doctrine. The scant references to post-conflict intelligence focused on an indigenous population that are currently imbedded within several joint publications, namely JP In most of our recent deployments, no one weapon system, no matter how expensive and technologically nature, has been as valuable as a single culturally competent foreign area officer.
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In its simplicity, the Manual discussed at length the psychology of a country's population. Joint Forces Command, tasked with the lead for Transformation within the Department of Defense, has taken a first step in placing more emphasis on cultural intelligence and the imperative to understand a country's or region's dynamics well beyond fielded forces or other potential combatants. The Draft Stability Operation Joint Operating Concept focuses on the vital period within a campaign that follows large-scale combat operations.
The joint stability force commander must have an understanding of who will oppose stabilization efforts and what motivates them to do so. It levies the requirement that intelligence analysis reach depths rarely explored within our current conventional intelligence mindset. The intelligence capabilities begin to focus on the unconventional threat posed by total spoilers.
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) - The Lightning Press SMARTbooks
Human intelligence also focuses on the identity, motivation, and intentions of limited and greedy spoilers. What will win the global war on terrorism will be people that can cross the cultural divide. Its an idea often overlooked by people [who] want to build a new firebase or a new national training center for tanks. John Abizaid, Commanders, U. That will require addressing intelligence challenges that are unconventional and uncomfortable for planners and commanders at all levels. Technology is not a panacea within our joint warfighting construct, and especially across the spectrum of intelligence requirements.
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As the world becomes even more complex, it is critical to understand the root causes and effects of the histories and cultures of the peoples with whom the joint force will interact. These requirements cannot be met with a narrowly focused approach toward intelligence preparation of the battle space. Our cultural strong suit is the ability to balance and integrate the technological with the human, and we must continue to stress getting the balance right.
If the current modus operandi of insurgents in Iraq is an indicator of the total disregard that future adversaries will have toward global societal norms, the joint force will, in many respects, be operating with one hand tied behind its back.
To do so risks adding yet another footnote to history, highlighting an intelligence gap between combat and stability and support operations. Books — Chandler, David G. The Campaigns of Napoleon. New York: Palgrave McMillan, New York: W.
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Napoleon and the Birth of the Modern Spain. Stackpole Books, Mechanicsburg, PA, Quantico, VA: U. Marine Corps University, The Fatal Knot. The Transformation of War. New York: The Free Press, Periodicals — Basham, Patrick and Radwan Masmoudi. I's in Iraq: A Cultural Gap. Internet Resources — Cordesman, Anthony H. Joint Forces Command. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Washington, D. Washington D.
Marine Corps. Small Wars Manual.
Chapter 1: Genesis of an ulcer Not a Frenchman then doubted that such rapid victories must have decided the fate of the Spaniards. Chapter 2: The Spanish resistance — a historical example I thought the system easier to change than it has proved in that country, with its corrupt minister, its feeble king and its shameless, dissolute queen.
Chapter 5: Striking a balance Our intelligence system is designed to support a Cold War kind of operation. Bibliography Books — Chandler, David G. Tone, 6. That goes a long way in my ability to determine the area of transmission. Critical infrastructure includes police and fire stations, government buildings, power plants, and fuel depots among many others , and the human terrain includes community leaders and demographics among many others.
Doing the legwork now in order to understand the community is a top priority for the S2, and this step never ends. Once identified, we begin developing intelligence requirements so we can learn more about each threat and provide better analysis. In other words, understand each threat as he understands himself.